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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 







BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as set forth in the brief of appellant are. 
somewhat as stated. However, appellant's assertions (1) 
that he remained in Salt Lake City from January of 1946 
to January of 1947 (Tr. 19) ; and, (2) that he returned 
to Utah in 1951 and remained for almost five months (Tr. 
18); are merely unsupported statements as to the fact 
which are, as to the issues, immaterial and of no moment. 
Of materiality is the fact that appellant was released on 
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bail in January of 1946 (Tr. 16, 20, 21); that appellant 
had no subsequent contact with his bondsman (Tr. 21); 
and that appellant knew the bond was forfeited (Tr. 21); 
all of which is indicative of the fact that appellant at no 
time demanded trial nor presented himself for trial. It is 
a material fact, not included in appellant's Statement of 
Facts, that the only attempt made to show bias or preju-
dice is as to that of the district attorney (Tr. 23) ; there 
was no proof adduced as to either bias or prejudice to ap-
pellant on the part of any jurist conducting the various 
trials and· hearings in this matter. Further, the mere as-
sertion in the complaint to the effect 
"that the * * * sentence is illegal because im-
posed by a judge who had divested himself of jur-
isdiction," (Tr. 11) 
and the statement of appellant made at the hearing that 
Judge Keller disqualified himself (Tr. 19) are not "State-
ments of Fact;" the first is a mere conclusion in the plead-
ings, the second an opinion· of the witness. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A PUB-
LIC AND SPEEDY TRIAL AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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POINT II 
THE HONORABLE F. W. KELLER, DISTRICT 
JUDGE FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, WAS NEV-
ER DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION IN THE 
MATTER; AND, HE HAVING RECEIVED THE 
VERDICT AND IMPOSED SENTENCE NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE DID 
NOT CONDUCT THE TRIAL NOR HEAR THE 
EVIDENCE, ERROR, IF ANY, WAS NOT JUR-
ISDICTIONAL SO AS TO BE OPEN TO IM-
PEACHMENT COLLATERALLY, i.e., BY HAB-
EAS CORPUS. THE COURT BELOW, BY SO 
HOLDING, DID NOT ERR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A PUB-
LIC AND SPEEDY TRIAL AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Brief of appellant would indicate that this point, first 
raised in his original complaint and presented to the lower 
court, has been by him abandoned. Respondent raises the 
point now only for the purpose of disposing of the question 
should this Honorable Court feel constrained to entertain 
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this phase of the pleadings. Our court has heretofore ruled 
on the issue. In the case of State v. Bohn, 67 Utah 362, 248 
P. 119, the court said: 
"* * * A defendant in a criminal action 
may waive his right to a speedy trial. He cannot re-
main inactive and afterwards complain that he has 
not been given a speedy trial and interpose that as 
a defense." 
In the case of Pietch v. U. S., (1940) 110 F. 2d 819, that 
court said: 
"The contention is made that it was prejudicial 
to the rights of appellant to be tried more than 
seven years after the termination of the transac-
tions on which the indictment was predicated. The 
indictment was returned before limitation had run. 
The United States Attorney stated in person and 
by letter to counsel for some of the accused that he 
did not intend to try the case, and that it was his 
purpose to dismiss it. But appellant never made 
demand for trial. He did not object or protest to 
the court respecting the delay. He filed a motion 
to dismiss the indictment on account of the delay, 
but the motion was filed more than three years 
after the return of the indictment, and it was a 
motion to dismiss-not a demand for trial. A per-
son charged with a crime cannot assert with success 
that his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States has been invaded unless he asked for a trial. 
In the absence of an affirmative request or demand 
for trial made to the court it must be presumed that 
appellant acquiesced in the delay and therefore can-
not complain." (and cases there cited.) 
See also State v. Schnell, (Mont. 1939) 88 P. 2d 19, 121 
A. L. R. 1082; also 14 Am. Jur. 863, Sec. 138. At no time, 
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prior to his apprehension on April 8th, 1952, did appellant 
present himself for trial nor request that he be tried. 
POINT II 
THE HONORABLE F. W. KELLER, DISTRICT 
JUDGE FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, WAS NEV-
ER DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION IN THE 
MATTER; AND, HE HAVING RECEIVED THE· 
VERDICT AND IMPOSED SENTENCE NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE DID 
NOT CONDUCT THE TRIAL NOR HEAR THE 
EVIDENCE, ERROR, IF ANY, WAS NOT JUR-
ISDICTIONAL SO AS TO BE OPEN TO IM-
PEACHMENT COLLATERALLY, i.e., BY HAB-
EAS CORPUS. THE COURT BELOW, BY SO 
HOLDING, DID NOT ERR. 
Respondent replies to Point I and Point II of appel-
lant's brief in this Point II of respondent's brief since the 
questions are so interrelated that they can best be simul-
taneously dealt with. 
The appellant contends that the Honorable Fred W. 
Keller divested himself of jurisdiction in this case by either: 
( 1) Disqualification on motion or affidavit of defen-
dant. 
(2) Voluntary disqualification due to bias or preju-
dice. 
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( 3) By calling in another judge to conduct the trial. 
Respondent does not find in the record neither motion 
nor affidavit directed to the qualifications of the Honorable 
Judge Keller to have heard this matter; there was no appli-
cation for change of judge made as provided for under 
Sections 77-25-2, 77-25-3, U. C. A. 1953, nor for disqualifi-
cation under.Rule 63 (b) U. R. C. P. Nor can respondent 
find anything in said record (beyond an allegation on in-
formation and belief in the amended complaint in the pres-
ent action) alleging, claiming, declaring or contending'that 
there existed anything in the mental attitude or disposi-
tion of the Honorable Judge Keller such as would imply 
"bias" or "prejudice" to this appellant. It is respectfully 
suggested that these issues are, therefore, not properly now 
before this court, nor timely raised. 
As to the third contention : This we admit, Judge 
Keller did call in another judge, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
to conduct the trial of the case, and, Judge Keller did there-
after in said matter receive the verdict and impose the 
. sentence. These facts raise the sole question, "If such be 
error, does it make for want of jurisdiction so as to rendl)r 
the judgment void, and being void, subject to collateral 
attack?" Respondent thinks not. 
According to the weight of authority, at common law, 
the acts of a disqualified judge are not mere nullities; they 
are simply erroneous and liable to be avoided or reversed 
on proper application, but cannot be impeached collaterally, 
except in the case of those inferior tribunals from which 
no appeal or writ of error lies. This is also the general 
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rule under statutes, in the absence of any express provi-
sion to the contrary or expressly prohibiting the judge from 
sitting, especially where the disqualification is regarded as 
a matter of personal privilege merely. (30 Am. Jur., Judges, 
Sec. 97, page 802.) By stating this rule respondent does 
not admit nor in any manner concede that Judge Keller 
was at any time in fact disqualified to act in this matter. 
We merely propose the principle that in any event his act 
was not a nullity but was at most erroneous and being only 
error not subject to attack by habeas corpus. 
"Where the court has jurisdiction by Ia w of the 
offense charged and of the party who is so charged,' 
its judgments are not, as a general rule, nullities 
which can be appealed collaterally as a basis for 
release by habeas corpus." 
Re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481, 41 L. Ed. 1085. 
The primary and ordinarily the only question involved 
in habeas corpus proceedings is one of jurisdiction-namely, 
whether the particular order, judgment or process whose 
validity is attacked is one coming within the lawful author-
ity of the court or officer making or issuing it. It is well 
settled that no court may properly release a prisoner held 
under warrant, conviction or sentence of another court 
unless for want of jurisdiction or some other matter ren-
dering its proceedings void. (See 25 Am. Jur., Habeas 
Corpus, Sec. 26.) Further, where the aid of a writ of habeas 
corpus is sought to secure the discharge of one who is re-
strained of his liberty by virtue of a judgment, the pro-
ceeding is a collateral assault upon judgments. It follows 
that the writ lies where the judgment attacked is absolutely 
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void, and only where this is the case. (See 25 Am. Jur., 
Habeas Corpus, Sec. 55.) 
Considering a similar, if not identical, situation as the 
issue here involves, the Supreme Court of the United States, 
in the case of U. S. v. V alante, 264 U. S. 563, 68 L. Ed. 
850, 44 S. C. 411, said: 
"Habeas corpus will not lie for the release of a pris-
oner because * * * the verdict was received by 
a judge other than the one who presided at the trial 
* r * * the error' if any was committed, would 
not go to the jurisdiction of the court or render the 
judgment void but was at the most one which could 
have been corrected upon review by writ of error. 
It is the well established general rule that a writ of 
habeas corpus cannot be utilized for the purpose of 
proceedings in error." 
In Commonwealth v. Thompson, ( 1937) 195 Atl. 115, also 
cited by appellant, wherein that court held that the substi-
tution of judges during the impaneling of the jury was not 
error, that court said: 
"The general rule prohibits entirely the substitution 
of a judge during the course of a criminal trial after 
a jury has been sworn and prior to a verdict." (Em-
phasis added.) Citing Freeman vs. U. S., 227 F. 
732. 
The court went on to state : 
"At other stages of trial, a different rule exists. As 
to receipt of the verdict, some courts have taken the 
view that the function must be performed by the 
judge who presided at the trial. In Hinman v. People, 
13 Hun. (N. Y.) 266, three judges presided at a 
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trial for grand larceny, and only one judge was on 
the bench when the verdict was received ; this was 
held to be reversible error. In England, under the 
common law, no judgment could be entered or exe-
cution ordered except by the judge who tried the 
case, but this rule has been changed by statute. In 
this state, since the receipt of the verdict is merely 
a routine matter and not the judgment of the court, 
another judge may receive the verdict as recorded, 
unless upon its receipt a motion or other matter 
develops which requires a personal knowledge of the 
case, in which event the trial judge should be pres-
ent." 
The writ of habeas corpus was not at issue in this case ; 
the appeal alleged error. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary 
remedy only and cannot be employed as an appellate remedy. 
(Bean v. State, 58 Idaho 797, 79 P. 2d 540.) See also, In 
Re Bates, (Idaho 1942) 125 P. 2d 1017; and generally 
.. Habeas Corpus, key 105. 
* * * * * 
Appellant's Point III presupposes first, his success in 
v this appeal to the extent that the Honorable Judge F. W. 
Keller was without jurisdiction and that the sentence by 
·· him imposed was void; second, that when and if this court 
grants the writ of habeas corpus, the State will deliver the 
appellant before the Honorable Judge A. H. Ellett for re-
sentencing. Respondent resists this Point III and appel-
lant's second supposition at this time on the ground that 
a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ in anticipation of 
~: error; appellant cannot anticipate the regular course of 
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proceedings by alleging a want of jurisdiction and demand-
ing a ruling thereon in habeas corpus proceedings. 
Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420; In Re Gregory, 219 
U.S. 210; Ex parte Simon, 208 U.S. 144; Johnson v. Hoy, 
227 U. S. 245; Urquart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179; Hyde v. 
Shine, 199 U. S. 62; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 59 L. 
Ed. 203, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 
U. S. 283, 63 L. Ed. 983, 39 Sup. Ct. 483. 
This court has said : 
"In habeas corpus proceedings nothing is inquired 
into except the legality of the restraint, * * *" 
Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent concludes that appellant has placed himself 
in such position as to preclude him from raising an objec-
. tion to the delay of his trial or trials; that appellant has 
, .' :•; adduced no proof as to show the Honorable F. W. Keller 
· · · disqualified in this matter either by motion made or affi-
davit filed, nor has appellant in any way shown or at-
tempted to show that there existed anything in the mental 
attitude or disposition of the said Judge Keller as would 
imply either "bias" or "prejudice" towards appellant. 
Finally, .respondent further concludes that habeas cor-
pus was not the proper remedy to employ to attack the sub-
.stitution of judges which took place only after the trial was 
concluded and at the time the jury returned its verdict. The 
error, if any was committed, did not go to the jurisdiction of 
the court or render the judgment void. Respondent contends 
that the order of the court below should and must be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, . 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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